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As a consequence of the recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy the agricultural 
sector throughout the EU is undergoing a process of major structural change. The removal of 
direct payments and price support policies are expected to change farmers’ behaviour and 
force them to reconsider their participation in agricultural production. In this paper we 
perform an ex-post cross-country farm level empirical analysis of farmers’ market exit 
behaviour in response to these reforms. Using a panel dataset for the EU15 countries for the 
period 2001-2005, we apply quasi-experimental empirical methods to identify the causal 
relationship between the decoupling policy and farm market exit. Our analysis shows that, 
contrary to a priori expectations, the probability of farm exit decreased due to the policy 
change, particularly for farms where payments are only partially decoupled. We also find, 
however, that the reform facilitated exit for farms that had already made the decision to leave 
the sector. 
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy, subsidy decoupling, farm exit, difference-in-
differences 
JEL classifications: D22, Q12, Q18 
a Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland (contact Andrius Kazukauskas 
kazukaua@tcd.ie) 
b Rural Economy Research Centre, Teagasc, Athenry, Co Galway, Ireland. 
c Department of Economics, University of Manchester 
* This research is funded under the Research Stimulus Fund 2007 of the Irish Department of 
Agriculture and Food whose support is gratefully acknowledged. Our thanks go to the 
European Commission and to the National Farm Survey, Teagasc for permitting the use of 
the data. 
  1. Introduction 
As a consequence of recent reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the EU 
agricultural sector is undergoing a process of major structural change. The removal of direct 
payments coupled to production is expected to change farmers’ behaviour and force them to 
reconsider their participation in agricultural production. In this paper, we analyse the impact 
of the introduction of decoupling on one component of the dynamics of the sector, namely 
farm exit behaviour, using quasi-experimental methods. We exploit the variation across 
countries in the timing of the implementation of the policy to identify the causal relationship 
between the decoupling of direct payments and farmers’ decisions to exit production. We find 
evidence that farm exit behaviour did change due to decoupling policy change but not always 
in the direction that we might expect. 
The 2003 reform of the CAP changed the way that the EU supports the agricultural sector and 
resulted in the majority of subsidies for agriculture in the EU15 being paid independently of 
the volume and type of production. In implementing the reforms, Member States had 
considerable flexibility in choosing the extent of decoupling, including the possibility of 
partial subsidy decoupling, and could choose the date of the introduction of the policy (2005-
2007). Although some of the implementation options are unique to single countries, there are 
several distinct groups of countries that adopted similar approaches. The variation in the 
implementation strategy across EU countries allows us to identify the effects of the policy 
reform on structural change in agriculture, in particular, farm exits. 
Economic theory suggests that agricultural production levels should fall in response to the 
decoupling of production from subsidy payments (Hennessy and Rehman 2006).
1 Andersson 
(2004) identifies two kinds of adjustments to policy change in the agricultural sector: changes 
in the level of production and changes in farm numbers. Both adjustment processes are 
interlinked given that an overall fall in the quantity of output being produced should have a 
negative effect on the number of farms continuing production since loss making farms will be 
forced to exit farming. However, agricultural markets might be distorted in different ways 
and these distortions might mitigate or even reverse the expected effects.  Burfisher and 
Hopkins (2003) examine the US experience with decoupled payments and find that 
decoupled payments are more likely to change farm production behaviour when the market in 
which farmers operate are free of other market distortions such as credit constraints, weak 
financial systems, and rigid labour markets. Andersson (2004) also noted that the indirect 
effects of the various types of policy supports offered to farmers, which he categorises into 
income effects, risk related effects and dynamic effects, may mean that the relationship 
between even fully decoupled lump-sum payments and the level of production persists. 
Swinbank et al. (2004) provide an overview and discussion of the wide range of theoretical 
reasons for expecting the decoupling of farm subsidies to have a limited effect on farm 
production decisions in the EU. They also consider reasons why decoupling may actually 
encourage a greater level of production. First, payments, while decoupled from production, 
remain tied to farming land and this has an “incentive effect” on farm production. Second, 
quasi-fixed farm assets (both farm-specific assets, and the human capital embodied in the 
farmer) typically have a low liquidation value. Thus, the adjustment costs to the new policy 
might be very high for farmers, meaning that farmers will continue their usual farming 
practice. Third, farmers may not be profit maximisers and decoupled payments provide an 

1 Chau and de Gorter (2005) propose that it is the removal of decoupled payments that will lead to farm exit.income cushion that helps maintain the revenue flow of the business and prolong the policy 
adjustment process. Moreover, Swinbank et al. (2004) also provide evidence of market 
imperfections and market distorting factors in the sector which may mitigate the expected 
decoupling policy effects including hobby farming, insurance and wealth effects
2 and limited 
capital constraints. 
Overall, the theoretical literature suggests that the effect of the decoupling policy on the 
behaviour of farms will be distorted by the presence of other market imperfections. However, 
very little empirical evidence exists to suggest this to be the case. Andersson (2004) and 
Happe et al (2008) highlight the fact that understanding the impact of decoupling on 
structural change and productivity of the EU agricultural sector have largely been neglected. 
Happe et al (2008) suggest that one of the reasons for the scarce empirical research on this 
issue is that econometric approaches are generally unsuitable for analysing the impact of the 
introduction of decoupling given that there is no historical precedent for this kind of policy. 
More recently, a literature has emerged that attempts to address these difficulties. For 
example, Happe et al (2008) employ an agent-based modelling approach and find that if farm 
payments are no longer tied to production but remain tied to land, the structure of the 
agricultural sector is hardly affected by decoupling as compared with the business-as-usual 
scenario. Kazukauskas et al (2010) and Kazukauskas et al (2011) analyse the effect of 
decoupling on productivity using a modified version of Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology 
for estimating productivity in a dynamic setting and find that decoupling had a significant and 
positive effect on the productivity of farms in Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands. Clancy 
et al (2010) provide a comprehensive cross-country descriptive study on structural change 
due to decoupling concluding that, in line with theoretical predictions, farmers made only 
minimal changes to production plans. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) analyse the effect of 
decoupled farm payments on farm production in the US and find that decoupled payments 
may lead to increased farm production. Paul et.al (2000) investigate the impacts of dramatic 
agricultural policy reforms towards market liberalisation in the 1980s on the farm efficiency 
of farms in New Zealand and find evidence that the liberal reforms did change farm output 
composition but did not stimulate farm technical efficiency. The scarcity of cross-country ex-
post research on the impact of the decoupling policy and, in particular, its impact on 
structural change in the EU agricultural sector, indicates a clear need for ex-post studies of 
the kind presented in this paper. 
In this paper we provide an empirical cross-country analysis of the effect of the decoupling of 
direct payments on farmers’ market exit behaviour. We use an extensive farm level panel 
dataset for the EU15 countries for the period 2001-2005 and exploit the variation in the 
timing of the implementation of the policy change to identify its effect. Using a difference-in-
differences approach allows us to separate out the effect of the policy change from other 
country and farm specific factors that may have impacted on farmers’ production decisions. 
We also make other contributions to the empirical agricultural economics literature by 
constructing new farm exit proxies that allow us to define gradual farm exit and a decoupling 
rate variable that controls for the fact that farms in different countries and farming systems 
may rely on subsidy payments to varying degrees. We also extend the model to take account 
of the fact that the extent to which farms depend on subsidies may also have an impact on 
how they are affected by the policy change. This allows us to understand better the 
mechanism through which decoupling impacts on farm exit to a greater extent than in the 
basic model. In addition, we include a new innovative control for unobserved farm 

2 See Serra et.al. (2006) for a review of the literature on the wealth effects of decoupling. heterogeneity which allows us to control for productivity changes in identifying the policy 
effect. The findings of this study will be of interest to policymakers concerned with 
addressing rural development issues arising as a result of CAP reform. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the policy background to the reform of 
the CAP and outlines how the treatment and control groups are selected. Section 3 presents 
the empirical approach while Section 4 presents data and the descriptive statistics of the main 
variables used. Section 5 presents and discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Policy background 
On 26 June 2003, EU farm ministers adopted a fundamental reform of the CAP.
3 The reform 
completely changes the way the EU supports the agricultural sector. The new CAP is geared 
towards consumers and taxpayers, while giving EU farmers the freedom to produce what the 
market wants. The majority of subsidies are paid independently from the volume of 
production. To avoid abandonment of production, Member States may choose to maintain a 
limited link between subsidies and production under well defined conditions and within clear 
limits. These new ‘single farm payments’ (SFP) will be linked to the maintenance of 
environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards. Severing the link between subsidies 
and production should make EU farmers more competitive and market oriented, while 
providing necessary income stability.  
Farmers are allotted payment entitlements based on reference amounts, calculated through 
different options depending on the individual Member State. Each entitlement is calculated 
by dividing the reference amount by the number of hectares which gave rise to this amount in 
the reference years. Payments are granted where farmers have eligible hectares at their 
disposal to activate the appropriate number of entitlements. Eligible hectares normally 
include all types of agricultural land except land used for permanent crops and forestry. 
Entitlements are activated annually by matching them with a corresponding number of 
eligible hectares. In general, transfer of entitlements is allowed once the SPS is introduced, 
but only within Member States and in some cases only within regions (Member States decide 
within EU rules). Transfers without land are allowed, but farmers taking over payment 
entitlements can only receive payment if the number of entitlements is matched by the correct 
number of eligible hectares.  
With regard to the implementation of the reform, the Commission has chosen to do this by 
way of three Commission Regulations. Regulation 1 covers the provisions concerning cross 
compliance, controls and modulation. The provisions with regard to cross compliance are one 
of the new key elements in the CAP reform, which make the future Single Farm Payment 
dependant on farmers respecting public health, animal health, environmental and animal 
welfare, EU norms and good agricultural practice.  Regulation 2 embodies the key element in 
the reform of introducing a Single Farm Payment, where the payment is no longer linked to 
production (decoupling), allowing farmers to have their incomes ensured and steering their 
production towards the needs of the markets and the demands of the consumers. Payments 
are, however, only paid in full if the above cross compliance provisions are respected. 
Regulation 3 covers those areas of support, which are still product specific, or where the 

3 For a more complete background on the CAP and its reform see European Commission press release (2004), 
Halmai and Elekes (2005) and the Dutch Council for Rural Areas (2008). Member States have the option to retain a certain element of support coupled in the future. 
Such possibilities have in particular been foreseen in the area of animal premia (beef and 
sheep), where the concern with regard to the effect on production and decoupling has been 
most pronounced.  
Although there is a common policy for agriculture across the EU-27, this does not mean that 
the agricultural sectors in the individual Member States are all similar. Due to varying 
physical, climatic and socio-economic conditions in the EU Member States, agriculture has 
evolved from a wide range of different circumstances. Member states have considerable 
flexibility in applying the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), and they are allowed to maintain 
some production linked payments in order to avoid abandonment of production. The main 
difference is whether they base the SPS on what direct payments individual farmers received 
in the historic reference period, thus producing different subsidy levels for each farmer, or 
whether all payments are averaged out over a state or region. Another major choice is the 
timing of the introduction of the SPS. Within the EU-15, Member States were required to 
introduce the SPS before January 2007.
4
The 2003 CAP reforms have provided a large space for national manoeuvre. Decoupling has 
been made less strict than the European Commission originally proposed and many elements 
of the reform fall within national competence, including: the possibility of partial decoupling; 
the determination of the date of introduction (2005-2007); limited freedom to select the single 
farm payment (SFP) calculation model (historic, regional or hybrid); and the reallocation of 
part of the support through the national envelope. Therefore, instead of a simplification of the 
support system, different decoupling models and the possibility of partial decoupling have 
resulted in a very complex system with a wide range of national diversity.  
As regards the SFP model there are two basic approaches. The historic model creates 
entitlements to support based on the average level of subsidies claimed in the livestock and 
arable sectors during the 2000- 2002 reference periods. The number of entitlements allocated 
to each farmer is set equal to the average area of land giving rise to a subsidy in addition to 
all pasture land during that same period. The value of each entitlement is established by 
dividing the average amount of subsidy claimed by the farmer by the number of entitlements 
awarded. The regional (area-based) model operates by basing the entitlements payable to 
farmers on the area of eligible land that they declare in 2005. The value of all entitlements 
within a region is then set at a single, common rate.  
A third approach to decoupling is also possible by combining the historic and regional 
approaches into what is termed a hybrid model. This can be done in different ways to create 
various forms of hybrid. Essentially, there are two broad hybrid classes – horizontal and 
vertical. A horizontal hybrid is created by putting a set proportion of the decoupled budget 
arising from each coupled regime into a regional element, with the balance of the budget 
allocated according to historical claim patterns. A vertical hybrid is created by putting 
specific coupled schemes, or proportions thereof, into the area based component, with the 
balance allocated according to historical claims patterns. Also, the ratio of regional and 
historical elements of hybrid models can vary in later years. If the ratios do not change in the 
future, the model is static, while if the model incorporates changing ratios the model is 

4 New Member States (NEU-12) who were applying the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) upon accession 
can introduce the SPS at any time. They are not included in our analysis. dynamic. ‘Dynamic hybrid’ systems can act as a vehicle to transit from the historic to the 
regional model approach. 
Table 1. Maximum rate of coupled support, selected products 
Supported Product  Maximum rate of coupled support (%) 
Cereals and oilseeds  25 
Rice 42 
Protein crops  100 
Sheep 50 
Beef 
   Option 1 
   Slaughter Premium 
   Suckler Cow Premium 
   Option 2 
   Slaughter Premium 
   Option 3 





Source: Halmai and Elekes (2005) 
Member States may maintain a proportion of product-specific direct aids in their existing 
form (known as ‘partial decoupling’), notably where they believe there may be a disturbance 
to agricultural markets or an abandonment of production by moving to the SPS. Member 
States may choose between several options, at national or regional level, but only under well-
defined conditions and within clear limits (outlined in Table 1). There is no time limit on 
continuing partial decoupling. Amounts paid out in partially decoupled form come from 
within national ceilings. Member States may grant ‘additional payments’ to support 
agricultural activities that encourage the protection or enhancement of the environment or for 
improving the quality and marketing of agricultural products. Additional payments may use 
up to 10 percent of the funds available (under national ceilings) in the SPS, thus reducing the 
funds available for basic SPS payments and product specific direct aids.  
There are various motivations for selecting a particular model, including: using an historic 
distribution of payments in order to prevent negative income effects; partial coupling in order 
to maintain certain types of production; partial coupling in order to prevent land 
abandonment; preventing a large administrative burden or; other reasons, such as providing a 
better rationale for the provision of farm payments in the long term.  
In order to separate countries into suitable treatment and control groups for the purpose of our 
empirical analysis, we match countries in terms of the timing and way in which the CAP 
reform policies were implemented. The identification of treatment and control groups will 
allow us to view the introduction of the decoupling policy as a natural experiment for 
establishing causal relationships between policy changes and farm exits. Table 2 summarises 
the various implementation policies which Member States have adopted. 
Although some of the implementation options are unique to a single country, there are several 
distinct groups of countries which adopt similar approaches to the implementation of the 
CAP reforms. Our core analysis is based on a separation of treatment and control groups 
based on the timing of the change to full or partial decoupling. The treated farm group 
consists of farms which are exposed to the decoupling policy in the year 2005 (both full and 
partial decoupling) while the control farm group consists of farms that were not exposed to 
the decoupling policy in 2005. As a robustness check, and to further explore the policy 
implementation options, we also consider the treated farm group to consist of farms that opted for full decoupling in 2005 as compared with farms not decoupled in 2005 and 
separately consider an alternative treated farm group consisting of farms that opted for partial 
decoupling in 2005 compared to the same control group. 
Table 2. National Implementation Policies  
Member State  Year  Model  Coupled Payments 
Treatment Group       
Ireland  2005  SPS historical  Full Decoupling 
Luxembourg  2005  SPS static hybrid  Full Decoupling 
UK (England)  2005  SPS dynamic hybrid  Full Decoupling 
UK (Wales)  2005  SPS historical  Full Decoupling 
UK (Northern Ireland)  2005  SPS static hybrid  Full Decoupling 
Austria  2005  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Belgium  2005  SPS historical  Partial Coupling  
Denmark  2005  SPS dynamic hybrid  Partial Coupling 
Germany  2005  SPS dynamic hybrid  Partial Coupling 
Italy  2005  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Portugal  2005  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Sweden  2005  SPS static hybrid  Partial Coupling 
UK (Scotland)  2005  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
      
Control Group       
Greece  2006  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Spain  2006  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Netherlands  2006  SPS historical  Partial Coupling 
Finland  2006  SPS dynamic hybrid  Partial Coupling 
France  2006  SPS historical  Max Possible Coupling 
Source: European Commission (2008) 
3. Empirical strategy 
Identifying the causal effect of policy changes on outcomes is difficult given that the effect of 
the change in policy can be hard to separate from other factors that may affect the outcome 
variable. For example, farm exit may be faster in one country compared with another due to a 
general lower level of productivity among farmers in that country. If low productivity 
countries are more likely to introduce decoupling early, then without controlling for these 
underlying differences across farms a biased positive effect of decoupling on farm exit may 
be observed.  In an attempt to identify a causal relationship between the decoupling of direct 
payments from production and farm exit, we consider a range of difference-in-differences 
and fixed effects estimators
5. Our identifying assumption in each case is that in the absence of 
decoupling, there are no differences between farms in countries exposed to decoupling in 
2005 and those exposed to the policy change at a later date that are not controlled for in the 
model. 
The difficulty in modelling farm exit using farm-level data is that we do not observe the farm 
once it has exited the sector. As such, we consider three proxy binary variables to capture the 
probability of a farm exiting: disinvestment and/or farm land reduction.
6 Using these 
variables allows us to capture the possibility that farms may not want to quit agricultural 

 McKenzie et al (2010) find evidence that non-experimental methods, other than instrumental variables, 
significantly overstate the average treatment effect in the case of labour migration, with difference-in-
differences estimators performing best among the alternatives to instrumental variables.
6 Sauer and Park (2009) construct binary variables based on farm productivity and financial leverage as proxies 
for farm exits from organic production. production in the immediate aftermath of the policy change, even if their profitability 
suggests that they should. They may, instead, start a gradual process of exiting farming. 
Impediments to farm exit may include:  an unwillingness to move to locations where there 
are opportunities to start new non-farming activities, difficulties in finding non-farming jobs 
in local rural areas, pure farming habit (“hobby” farming). Capital disinvestment decisions 
(selling farm capital) may indicate that a farm has started the gradual process of exiting the 
sector by reducing capital stock and overall production scale. The reduction in the use of land 
may also indicate a gradual farm exit decision and/or farm production scale reduction. We 
also consider a combination of both disinvestment and farm land reduction as a third proxy 
variable for gradual farm exit. By considering this latter measure we eliminate the possibility 
that the reduction in land or capital investment is a reflection of farmers deciding to substitute 
inputs (land or capital) for each other. The farmer’s decision to reduce land area and capital 
inputs simultaneously may indicate a real determination to exit farming or at least a real 
reduction in farm size. 
We consider different policy variables to capture the introduction of decoupling in our 
empirical models. The common difference-in-differences approach uses binary variables to 
indicate treatment of a particular sub-group of observations.  As such, we first consider a 
binary indicator variable for a country that introduced the decoupling policy in 2005 and 
identify this group as the treatment group. Various treatment groupings are considered (full-
decoupling, partial-decoupling and a combination) as discussed in Section 2. 
As indicated above, our identifying assumption in each difference-in-differences model is 
that, once suitable controls are included, the only difference between treatment and control 
countries is the timing of the policy change. An innovation in our approach is that in addition 
to controlling for time invariant farm specific effects (age, size, soil quality, etc) we also 
control for time variant unobserved variables such as farm specific productivity changes. 
Time varying farm specific unobserved productivity may affect the exit decision of treatment 
and control farms in different ways and as such controlling for these differences is crucial for 
our identification assumption. In line with Levihnson and Petrin (2003), we use the farmer’s 
choice of intermediate inputs to control for unobserved farm individual productivity (). 
We assume that the demand for intermediate inputs is given by   	  
 
 , 
where   are intermediate inputs,  is capital and  i s  l a n d .  W e  a l s o  a s s u m e  t h a t  
intermediate input demand is monotonic and increasing in . Inverting this function will 
give us an expression for    	
 
  that can be used to control for 
productivity in the exit model.
7   
3.1.Modelling the probability of gradual farm exit 
The first stage of this analysis constructs a model of the probability of farm exit focusing on 
the role of policy changes in this decision. The underlying exit decision is modelled as 
*
it i it i it EXIT u η =+ + + z  x           ( 1 )  
where 
is a latent variable that underlies an observed indicator variable that captures 
whether or not a farm exits production according to the following rule:  

7 We use lagged capital and land variables to avoid endogeneity problems which may arise in our empirical 
estimation.      
  
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where  ) are farm specific time invariant variables; % are farm specific time variant 
variables (such as capital, land etc); and  & are farm specific unobserved heterogeneity 
effects (random effects). 
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in probit models is complicated. In the linear 
model, unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for by including fixed farm-specific 
effects. In non-linear models, however, any attempt to estimate fixed unobserved 
heterogeneity effects (&) will lead to the incidental parameters problem, resulting in biased 
and inconsistent estimates (Neyman and Scott 1948; Newman et al. 2008). However, using 
random effects requires the assumption that the random effects are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables in the model. This is a restrictive assumption, particularly in the context 
of the model we are attempting to estimate where farm specific variables, such as choice of 
capital inputs and farm characteristics, are likely to be correlated with the unobserved 
heterogeneity.
8
To control for potential correlations between the random effects and the other exogenous 
variables, an alternative option is to model the unobserved heterogeneity (random effects) as 
a function of the means of the time varying explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2005).
9
&  * (% +,-(             ( 4 )  
where % +, is an average of %,. over time for each individual and * is a constant term. We 
assume that time invariant  is distributed as /	
01
2 and is uncorrelated with %,. and other 
time invariant exogenous variables.
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As indicated, differences in the timing and nature of the reform policies implemented across 
the EU-15 countries are used as a natural experiment for establishing causal policy 
relationships. As discussed in Section 2, countries are grouped in terms of the timing of the 
implementation of the policy changes and treatment and control groups are identified on the 
basis of this grouping. This is incorporated into the random effects probit model in the 
following way: 
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
8 Foltz (2004) uses a random effects probit model to estimate a model of farm entry and exit but does not control 
for the potential correlation between the random effects and the independent variables. 
9 See Newman et al (2008) for an applied example. Where  is a binary treatment indicator of decoupling; ;< is a time dummy for the year of 
the policy implementation (specifically, in our case, for 2005); and 7 are time dummies by 
year for the other time periods. We are interested only in the sign and significance of : as this 
will give us the difference between the treatment and control groups in the probability of exit 
before and after the introduction of the decoupling policy.
10
In our analysis, we also consider the possibility that the extent to which farms depend on 
subsidy payments might have an effect on their exit probability. Goetz and Debertin (2001) 
find that farmers exit production at a faster rate the more they depend on government 










it output farm total
payments decoupled payments direct farm total
dr
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_ _ _ _
1
   (7)
As discussed in Section 2, EU countries adopted different decoupling policy implementation 
strategies. Some countries switched to full decoupling from 2005 while others opted for a 
slower decoupling policy implementation strategy having partially decoupled direct farm 
payments in 2005. Furthermore, different countries might have a greater reliance on subsidies 
than others. The variation in the implementation strategy and in the types of farm production 
systems across countries might invoke different reactions among farmers to the introduction 
of the decoupled payment. Moreover, farmers might be less responsive to policy changes if 
farm incomes are not significantly dependent on subsidies or the SFP. The decoupling rate 
variable (=) is denominated by total farm output, so it takes into account the extent to 
which farms are dependent on farm subsidies/decoupled payments.
11  The inclusion of this 
variable therefore controls for the fact that the exit behaviour of farms may depend on the 
extent to which they rely on subsidies/direct payments. We may also expect, however, that 
the effect of the decoupling policy on exit behaviour will also depend on their reliance on 
subsidies and payments. We therefore also introduce this variable into the difference-in-
differences model. 
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            ( 8 )  
In this model we control for whether the decoupling rate (or reliance on subsidies) has an 
effect on exit but also explicitly model the extent to which the effect of subsidies changes 
post-decoupling relative to the control group. This will be determined by the sign and 
significance of >?@

10 Ai and Norton (2003) highlight the fact that the coefficients on interaction terms included in non-linear 
models are often misinterpreted in applied research. Puhani (2008) shows that while the cross difference does 
not represent the treatment effect and is not an interesting parameter in a nonlinear difference-in-differences 
model, but it is correct to focus on the sign of the interaction term coefficient. 
11 The decoupling rate variable (=) ranges in value from 0 to 1. A value close to 0 means that the farm’s 
decoupling rate is very low, i.e. all farm direct payments are coupled to production and/or the farm’s 
dependency on coupled subsidies relative to farm total output is very high. A value close to 1 means that the 
farm only receives decoupled payments and/or the coupled direct farm payments are very low relative to the 
farm’s total output, so the farm’s dependence on subsidies for income is low. 3.2. Modelling the intensity of gradual farm exit 
In the second stage we utilize information about the levels of disinvestment and/or land 
reduction to establish the extent to which causal links between policy changes and gradual 
farm exit can be established as measured by farm capital disinvestment or farm land 
reduction decisions. For this purpose we consider just the farms that disinvested or reduced 
their land use.
12  The model we estimate is given by equation (9). 




7        ( 9 )
The specific linear difference-in-differences model estimated is given by equation (10).
13
ABCC D E  ( 7  (F  (9    (: 	   ;  < (G ,.H(I  (10) 
where ;<is a time dummy for the  implementation of the policy (for 2005); is a binary 
decoupling policy treatment variable;  Eare country specific fixed effects; 7are time 
dummies by year for every time period; and Fare farm sector specific fixed effects.
We may also expect that the effect of the decoupling policy on exit intensity will also depend 
on the reliance of farmers on subsidies and payments and so we also include the decoupling 
rate measure, dr, defined in equation (7) 
ABCC D E  (7  (F  (9    (:	 ;  <   (
>*= (> 	;< =  (> 2	 =  (> ?	;<   =  (G ,.H(I         (11) 
The average policy treatment effect, taking into account decoupling rate differences, will be 
determined by the sign and significance of >?@
We include farm system and country fixed effects to control for exogenous differences 
between the treatment and control groups. As a robustness check, we also include farm sector 
and country specific time trends in these models.  This allows treatment and control countries 
to follow different trends thus further strengthening our identification assumption (Angrist 
and Pischke 2009). The motivation for including these variables comes from the fact that 
countries have slightly varying national agricultural policies, different socio-economic 
conditions and climates which may affect farm exit trends across EU countries. A similar 
motivation exists for the inclusion of farm sector time trends given that the EU CAP reform 
policies affect farms in different ways depending on their farm sector. We also consider 
different treatment groups as a robustness check. Conditional fixed effects logit models and a 




12  Controlling for sample selection bias is not required in this model as we are explicitly modelling the 
behaviour of those farms which have strategically chosen to exit farming (based on our proxy variables).  
13 Note that exit intensity is measured in Euros when we use disinvestment as the proxy for farm exit and in 
hectares when we consider farm land reduction as the proxy for farm exit. 4. Data 
Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) farm level data on all EU15 countries covered by 
the CAP for the 2001-2005 time period are used  The full list of variables with summary 
statistics for each country are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.  Descriptive statistics 
for each of the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis are presented in 
Table 3.
14 The share of disinvesting farms decreased in both control and treatment groups but 
the decrease was larger in the treatment group. In contrast, the share of farms that reduced the 
amount of land allocated to farming increased for both groups but more significantly for the 
treatment group.  Meanwhile the share of observations that disinvested capital and reduced 
farming land simultaneously increased marginally for both groups.
15
The average level of capital disinvestment increased between the pre and post decoupling 
period for both treatment and control groups, but the increase was much greater for the 
treated farms. Also of note is that for the control group the average area of land farmed 
increased between the pre and post decoupling periods while for the treated group a reduction 
in farm land of almost 35 percent is observed. 
Descriptive statistics for the decoupling rate variable (dr described in equation 7) reveal that 
for the treated group the decoupling rate increased from 74 percent to 89 percent. This means 
that after the decoupling policy was implemented (2005) the average farm dependency on 
coupled subsidies relative to total farm output decreased from 26 percent to almost 11 percent 
for the treatment group. In contrast, the average farm dependency on coupled subsidies 
increased slightly for the control group. 
Descriptive statistics for the other main control variables are also presented.  Of particular 
note is the fact that farms in the treatment and control groups are different in terms of size 
(both output and size of farmland used) and so it is important to control for farm 
heterogeneity in our model. 
  

14 Descriptive statistics disaggregated by partial and full decoupling are presented in Table A2 of the Appendix. 
15 Actual farm exits might influence the amount of farms that disinvest or reduce farm land. However, we do not 
have data on farm exits. We consider farm sample exit as a proxy for actual exit as an additional robustness 
check in the empirical section. The pattern of farm exit from the sample across countries is presented in Table 
A3 of the Appendix and reveals that sample exit is similar in the treatment and control groups. Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Dis-investment
Control Treatment 
% n % n 
Pre-decoupling 12.65  85,794  16.35  134,553 
Post-decoupling  11.88 21,492 12.88 33,002 
Total  12.50 107,286 15.67 167,555 
Land Reduction
Control Treatment 
% n % n 
Pre-decoupling 17.82  85,794  14.76  133,389 
Post-decoupling  18.28 21,492 16.80 33,002 




% n % n 
Pre-decoupling 2.10  85,794  2.44  133,389 
Post-decoupling  2.23 21,492 2.62 33,002 




Mean Std.  n  Mean  Std. n 
Pre-decoupling 9272  55,100  10855  9,281  54,868  22,003 
Post-decoupling 13688  88,486  2554  17,932  126,183  4,250 




Mean Std.  n  Mean  Std. n 
Pre-decoupling 5.92  61.35  15,287  6.45  32.04  19,693 
Post-decoupling 4.84  63.88  3,928  8.65  27.23  5,545 




Mean  Std. n  Mean  Std. n 
Pre-decoupling  0.7211 0.2924 85,788 0.7365 0.2763  134,546 
Post-decoupling  0.7061 0.3004 21,492 0.8908 0.1934 32,997 




Mean Std.  Mean  Std. 
Output,  EUR  114,000  211,833 161,368 44,1882 
Investment, EUR  18,111  102,774  20,417  98,136 
UAA, hectares  54.88  84.63  75.57  207.39 
Subsidies,  EUR  17,663  25,747 26,720 77,023 
Payments, EUR  23  62  4,167  28,631 
Capital,  EUR  113,075  202,079 178,332 361,678 
Direct Cost, EUR  84,720  167,357  117,339  405,645 
Note: The pre-treatment period is from 2001 to 2004 while the treatment period is 2005.
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Gradual farm exit dynamics  
Before estimating the main difference-in-differences regression models, we examine how the 
probability of gradual farm exit and the intensity of exit vary over time. The results are 
presented in Table 4. The first three columns of Table 4 show how the probability of gradual 
farm exit varies over time. We observe a significant change in disinvestment behaviour in 
2005 when the increasing trend in disinvestment between 2001 and 2004 is reversed. This is 
in line with Andersson (2004) who found that farm investment is likely to be greater after 
decoupling than in the absence of such payments. In contrast, however, the probability of 
reducing farm land increased significantly in 2005. Once reductions in capital and farming land are taken together as indicators of farm exit we find an increasing trend over time. We 
observe a similar pattern for farm exit intensity. Conditioning on farms that disinvest, we find 
that the intensity of disinvestment and land reduction increased over time. 

















1 2 3 4 5 
y2002 0.045***  -0.001  0.033*  -1322  0.637 
y2003 0.046***  0.028***  0.041**  -543  0.902** 
y2004 0.054***  0.014  0.049***  3059*  1.203*** 
y2005 -0.028**  0.038***  0.051***  7852***  2.983*** 
country dummies  yes  yes  yes  -  - 
farm system dummies  yes  yes  yes  -  - 
polynomial  yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.139  0.0654  0.058  0.008  0.2987 
No of observations  21,5122  215,122  215,122  30,820  44,382 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
These results provide some evidence that between 2001 and 2005 the probability and 
intensity of farm exit was on an increasing trend. The one exception is a reversal of this trend 
when farm investment decisions are considered in isolation post CAP reform. While this 
suggests that the decoupling policy may have changed farmers’ exit decisions, lowering the 
probability of exit, this analysis does not allow us to credibly identify such a policy effect. As 
discussed in Section 3, to identify causality in this setting, given that there may be other 
factors that influence the probability and pace of farm exit within countries, we consider two 
distinctive farm groups – those exposed to the policy change in 2005 (treatment group) and 
those that are not (control group). Using difference-in-differences and controls for farm 
specific heterogeneity allows us to identify the causal effect of the policy. 
5.2.Probability of gradual farm exit 
We consider two types of difference-in-differences models, as discussed in Section 3: first, a 
simple difference-in-differences model where a binary variable is used to capture the policy 
effect (taking a value of one if the farm is affected by the decoupling policy in 2005); and 
second, an expanded difference-in-differences model which takes into account farm 
heterogeneity in terms of farm dependency on coupled farm direct payments where the 
control variable is defined as the ratio of coupled subsidies to total output (dr). Table 5 
summarizes the main results with a more detailed exposition presented in Tables A4 and A5 
of the Appendix. As discussed in Section 3, we use a random effects probit model with 
controls for potential correlations between the random effects and the time varying 
independent variables. This approach, however, affects our interpretation of the coefficients 
in the model and in particular on the interaction terms which in our case is the main effect of 
interest (the interaction between the treatment dummy and the policy intervention). As 
discussed by Puhani (2008), where average treatment effects are the main effects of interest 
in a non-linear setting, only the sign and significance is of relevance and as such this is all 
that we report in Table 5. 
  Table 5. Effect of decoupling on the probability of farm exit 
   Dis-investment  Land Reduction  Dis-inv & land reduction 
   DD DD*dr DD DD*dr DD DD*dr 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy effect  negative negative negative negative negative negative 
significance  *** ***  *  **  **  - 
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
farm system dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
polynomial  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
x means  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sector specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood  -73,214 -73,200 -96,819 -96,808 -25,993 -25,980 
No of observations  215,122 215,110 215,122 215,110 215,122 215,110 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Each model is estimated using a random effects probit approach. 
A 4
th order polynomial is included to capture productivity changes. 
x means are means of time varying variables within farms included to capture the possible correlation between 
farm random effects and time varying variable (land, capital, etc.). 
DD is the interaction of the treatment variable and treatment time dummy (;<  ). 
Columns with DD*dr indicate difference-in-differences models where we control for farm heterogeneity in 
terms of farm dependency on coupled subsidy payments. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the effect of decoupling on capital disinvestment decisions. 
For the simple difference-in-differences model (column 1) and the model which controls for 
coupled payments dependency (column 2) we find that decoupling had a negative and 
significant effect on the probability of a farm disinvesting, or exiting production. Two 
possible explanations for this result emerge. First, the decoupling of payments from 
production increases the certainty of income flows and so may make farmers more likely to 
invest (or cease disinvestment). If farmers are risk averse and prefer certain income 
(decoupled payments) to uncertain income (coupled payments), then the decoupling of 
payments may encourage them to undertake new investments (Hennessy 1998).
16 Second, 
increased certainty relaxes capital credit constraints. As studies by Swinbank et al (2004), 
Andersson (2004) and others indicate, decoupled payments offer a better form of collateral to 
credit institutions than subsidies coupled to production given the increased certainty of farm 
income cash flow. Goodwin and Mishra (2005) use this argument to explain why decoupled 
farm payments affect farm acreage decisions in the US. Furthermore, decoupled payments 
may also increase the value of land (Brady et al. 2009), further improving the availability of 
collateral for capital credit. Relaxed capital constraints combined with certainty about future 
income flows may explain why the probability of disinvestment declines as a result of 
decoupling. 
Columns 3 to 4 of Table 5 show how the probability that farms reduce their land holdings is 
affected by decoupling. We find that, in contrast to the time dynamics presented in Table 4, 
the probability of gradual farm exit in the form of land reduction decreased for the treated 
farm group in response to the policy change. The significance level, however, is marginal. 

16 This finding is consistent with Guiso and Paiella (2008) who show that individuals who are more likely to 
face income uncertainty or to become liquidity constrained exhibit a higher degree of absolute risk aversion and 
smaller investment levels. This result may be explained by the fact that while payments are decoupled from production, 
farmers remain tied to eligible land. As discussed by Swinbank et al (2004) direct payments 
linked to even one production input might dampen the decoupling policy effect. While we 
might expect decoupling to offer farms an incentive to cease production, if these payments 
remain tied to the land, exit is less likely. 
Our final model considers a more stringent proxy for farm exit that accounts for the fact that 
capital and land might be input substitutes and that the policy change might encourage farms 
to adjust their input allocation. If this is the case then the results presented in columns 1 to 4 
might be capturing changes in input allocation in response to decoupling rather than actual 
farm exit. The variable takes a value of one for farms that disinvest and reduce their land 
holdings simultaneously. As revealed in columns 5 to 6 of Table 5 we do find some evidence 
that the probability of gradual farm exit decreased due to the policy change when we use both 
disinvestment and land reduction as a proxy for farm exit, though the statistical significance 
of this result is not as strong as for the other model specifications.  
5.3.Gradual farm exit intensity 
In this section we consider the change in farm exit intensity induced by the CAP reform using 
the same policy treatment variables as in the previous section. To proxy farm exit intensity 
we use the level of disinvestment and land reduction. Our hypothesis is that the decoupling 
policy might encourage farms considering exiting production to intensify this process and so 
we select farms that have already made the decision to disinvest or reduce their land 
allocations.
17 Table 6 summarises our findings from the difference-in-differences and fixed 
effects model specifications. The estimated policy effects are expressed in terms of euro in 
the case of disinvestment or hectares in the case of land reduction. More detailed results for 
these model specifications are presented in Table A6 of the Appendix. 
Table 6. Effect of decoupling on the intensity of farm exit 
Disinvestment (EUR)  Land reduction (ha) 
   DD DD*dr DD DD*dr DD  DD*dr DD DD*dr 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
policy effect  2105 1285 1276 980 3.20 -0.08  3.88 -0.42 
significance  - - - -  **  -  *** - 
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
country dummies  yes yes  -  -  yes  yes  - - 
farm system dummies  yes yes  -  -  yes  yes  - - 
polynomial  yes yes yes yes yes yes  yes yes 
fixed effects  no no yes yes no  no  yes yes 
R
2 0.089 0.089 0.008 0.009 0.259 0.263  0.300 0.303 
n  30,820 30,820 30,820 30,820 44,382 44,382  44,382 44,382 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
DD is the interaction of the treatment variable and treatment time dummy (;<  ). 
Columns with DD*dr indicate difference-in-differences models where we control for farm heterogeneity in 
terms of farm dependency on coupled subsidy payments. 
We find some evidence that the intensity of land reduction increased in response to the 
introduction of the decoupling policy, even when we control for farm fixed effects (columns 
5 and 7 of Table 6). We find that when exposed to decoupling, land reduction increases by 

17  We do not control for sample selection in this model and so our results should be interpreted a being relevant 
to farms that have already decided to exit agricultural production. between 3.2 and 3.9 hectares, however, we find no significant effect when we control for 
farm subsidy dependency. On the basis of these results we conclude that there is some 
evidence to suggest that farms intensify the farm exit process (in terms of farm land 
reduction) in response to the decoupling policy but in general the evidence is far from 
conclusive. 
We find no significant effect of the policy change on the intensity of disinvestment. This 
result is consistent across all model specifications (columns 1-4 of Table 6), though almost all 
point estimates suggest that the intensity of disinvestment increased for policy treated farms. 
Although not statistically significant, it may indicate that some farms intensified their farm 
exit process in terms of disinvestment. This may be due to the increased certainty in the 
business environment that came with the introduction of the decoupling policy, helping farms 
to make the decision to exit, that previously may have postponed this decision due to 
uncertainties about the policy change. 
5.4 Robustness Checks 
The first set of robustness checks are performed as a check on the econometric approach 
employed. For all random effects probit model specifications presented we estimate both 
fixed effects logit and linear fixed effects models using identical specifications. In all cases, 
our results are robust to the use of these alternative econometric approaches.
18
The second set of robustness checks concern the selection of treatment and control groups.  
Given that some countries opted for full decoupling while others opted for partial decoupling, 
considering each group as separate treatment groups will serve as a useful robustness check 
on our results but may also offer new insights into the explanations for the results we observe 
in our core model. The results for each group considered separately as treatment groups are 
presented in Table 7. For the binary treatment variable we find that farms exposed to partial 
decoupling are less likely to exit (based on the disinvestment proxy and the proxy variable 
that considers disinvestment and land reduction – see Panel A). This result is also consistent 
with the inclusion of controls for farm heterogeneity in terms of dependence on coupled 
direct payments (Panel B). In contrast, we find no evidence to suggest that full decoupling 
induces such changes in the behaviour of farmers. In most cases we find that farms exposed 
to full decoupling are no different to farms not exposed to the policy change in terms of exit 
decisions. Moreover, we find that farms exposed to full decoupling are more likely to reduce 
their land holdings in response to the policy change. We offer a number of explanations for 
the finding that decoupling slows the pace of exit: 1) we suggest that it may be due to more 
certain income flows which provide risk averse farmers with greater incentives to invest; 2) 
the increased certainty of income, combined with increases in land values, provide more 
collateral for farmers to borrow to invest; 3) the fact that payments remain linked with land 
holdings reduces the impact that decoupled payments will have. The fact that this result only 
appears to hold for partially decoupled payments suggests that subsidies that remain linked to 
production will discourage farmers from exiting. 
  

18 Results available on request. Table 7. Effect of decoupling on the probability of farm exit (partial vs. full decoupling)  
Panel A 
(DD)  Dis-investment Land  Reduction 
Dis-investment and Land 
Reduction 
   Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy effect  negative negative negative positive negative positive 
significance  *** -  - *** *  - 
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
farm system dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
polynomial  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
x means  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sector specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood  -66,485 -33,949 -90,658 -47,172 -23,722 -11,691 
No of observations  199,987 107,271 199,987 107,271  199,9887  107,271 
Panel B 
(DD*dr)  Dis-investment Land  Reduction 
Dis-investment and Land 
Reduction 
   Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Policy effect  negative negative negative negative negative negative 
significance  **  - *** -  -  - 
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
farm system dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
polynomial  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
x means  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
country specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sector specific time 
trends  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Log Likelihood  -66,480 -33,948 -90,622 -47,172 -23,704 -11,687 
No of observations  199,987 107,271 199,987 107,271  199,9887  107,271 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Each model is estimated using a random effects probit approach. 
A 4
th order polynomial is included to capture productivity changes. 
x means are means of time varying variables within farms included to capture the possible correlation between 
farm random effects and time varying variable (land, capital, etc.). 
DD is the interaction of the treatment variable and treatment time dummy (;<  ). 
Columns titled ‘partial’ present the difference-in-differences results where the treatment group are those farms 
exposed to partial decoupling in 2005 with the control group being farms not exposed to any form of decoupling 
in 2005. Columns titled ‘full’ present the difference-in-differences results where the treatment group are those 
farms exposed to full decoupling in 2005 with the control group being farms no exposed to any form of 
decoupling in 2005. 
Our final robustness check considers actual sample exit as the proxy variable for farms 
exiting agricultural production. The results are presented in Table 8.  In line with our 
previous findings we find evidence to suggest that the introduction of decoupling reduces the 
probability of a farm exiting the sample. Table 8. Effect of decoupling on the probability of actual sample exit
(1) (2) 
dr*Y05*T  - -0.117 
T* Y05  -0.430*** -0.279*** 
dr* Y05  - -0.324*** 
dr*T  - -0.083*** 
dr  - 0.188*** 
Y05  0.044*** 0.274*** 
T  0.081*** 0.807*** 
year dummies  yes  Yes 
sector dummies  yes  Yes 
county dummies  yes  Yes 
polynomial yes  Yes 
x means  yes Yes 
log-likelihood  -81,640 -81,568 
n  210,830 210,818 
farms  75,446 75,444 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Each model is estimated using a random effects probit approach. 
A 4
th order polynomial is included to capture productivity changes. 
x means are means of time varying variables within farms included to capture the possible correlation between 
farm random effects and time varying variable (land, capital, etc.). 
6. Conclusions 
The recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has exposed the European 
agricultural sector to a new set of constraints and challenges. In this paper, we explore the 
effect of these reforms on gradual farm exit behavioural changes. Economic theory suggests 
that in the absence of market distortions and imperfections agricultural production levels 
should fall in response to the introduction of subsidies that are decoupled from production 
and would lead to loss-making farms exiting production.  However, as proposed in the 
theoretical literature analysing the potential impact of the decoupling policy, the existence of 
other market distortions and imperfections in the sector means that the actual effect that the 
policy implementation will have is unclear and remains an important puzzle to solve 
empirically. In this regard, the primary contribution of this paper is an ex-post empirical 
cross-country analysis of farmers’ market exit behaviour after the recent CAP reform. We use 
a difference-in-differences approach to identify a causal relationship between the introduction 
of decoupled farm payments and gradual farm exit changes. We also make contributions to 
the empirical agricultural economics literature by suggesting new farm exit proxies allowing 
us to define gradual farm exit, and suggest new unobserved farm heterogeneity controls never 
before considered in models of this kind. 
We find evidence that decoupling policy had a positive effect on farm survival probability. 
This result is robust for almost all model specifications we have explored. This policy effect 
may in part be determined by: the increased cash flow associated with the payments; the 
relaxing of capital constraints induced by the increased certainty associated with farm 
incomes; but also given that decoupled payments are subject to eligible agricultural land area, 
farms are less likely to exit once the payments are in place. Our results suggest that the reason 
may be associated with the fact that payments remain linked with production given that only 
partially decoupled payments have a negative effect on farm exit.  We also find some evidence that land reduction and disinvestment intensity increased for 
those exiting farms that were ‘policy-treated’. This may be explained by the increased 
certainty in the farm business environment leading farms contemplating exit prior to the 
policy change to make the decision to exit once the policy is in place. 
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